In the classical private information retrieval (PIR) setup, a user wants to retrieve a file from a database or a distributed storage system (DSS) without revealing the file identity to the servers holding the data. In the quantum PIR (QPIR) setting, a user privately retrieves a classical file by downloading quantum systems from the servers. The QPIR problem has been treated by Song et al. in the case of replicated servers, both without collusion and with all but one servers colluding. In this paper, the QPIR setting is extended to account for MDS-coded servers. The proposed protocol works for any [n, k]-MDS code and t-collusion with t = n − k. Similarly to the previous cases, the rates achieved are better than those known or conjectured in the classical counterparts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR), a problem initially introduced by Chor et al. [1] , enables a user to download a data item from a database without revealing the identity of the retrieved item to the database owner. During the past few years, PIR has gained renewed interest in the setting of distributed storage systems (DSSs), where the servers are storing possibly large files that may be encoded, e.g., by an MDS code. The capacity of PIR is already known in a variety of settings [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , but is still open for coded and colluding servers [7] , [8] . Progress towards the general coded colluded PIR capacity was recently made in [9] , [10] .
More recently, Song et al. have considered a similar problem in a quantum setting. They consider a replicated storage system with classical files, where the servers respond to user's (classical) queries by sending quantum systems. The user is then able to privately retrieve the file by measuring the quantum systems. The servers are assumed to share some maximally entangled states, while the user and the servers are not entangled. The non-colluding case was considered in [11] , and was shown to have capacity equal to one. This is in contrast to the classical replicated (asymptotic) PIR capacity 1 − 1 n for n servers. The case of all but one servers colluding was considered in [12] , again achieving higher capacity than the classical counterpart. In this case, the QPIR capacity is 2 n , while classically (and asymptotically) it is 1 n .
A. Contributions
We adapt the QPIR protocol for replicated storage systems protecting against collusion of all but one servers [12] to the case of [n, k] MDS coded servers and arbitrary t-collusion. That is, from the case t = n − 1 to t = n − k. This can be seen as trading off collusion protection for reduced storage overhead. The achieved rate 2 n is higher than the conjectured asymptotic rate in the classical coded and colluding PIR [7] , giving 1 n . The setup is very similar to [13] , which provides an optimal classical PIR scheme for the case t = n − k. This was extended to cover non-maximal collusion (t < n−k) in [7] by considering the queries as coming from another code via the star product scheme. With this interpretation, the query code in [13] is the dual of the storage code -similarly as in the QPIR protocol presented here -while [7] enables it to be any [n, t] MDS code for t ≤ n − k. One may wonder why we do not do this generalization here, but merely use the dual as the query code. This is simply due to the limitation imposed by quantum measurement, see the discussion in Remark 2.
II. BASICS ON PIR AND QUANTUM COMPUTATION

A. Notation
For any two vectors u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ), v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) of the same length n we denote their inner product by u|v = u 1 v 1 +· · ·+u n v n . We will denote by [n] the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, and by F q the finite field of q elements. In this paper, we only consider characteristic two, i.e., q = 2 E for some positive integer E.
Note that this mapping preserves addition, i.e., ϕ(α , where each server stores a share y i , i ∈ [m] of each (encoded) file (for replication y K = x K ). In a PIR protocol a user desiring the K-th file X K chooses a query Q K from a query space Q and transmits it to the servers. The servers' response A i is a function of the received queries and the shares of the (encoded) files they store. By query and response here we mean the overall matrix containing all the individual queries and responses. Below, Q K T denotes the matrix of queries sent to a subset T .
As usual, we assume honest-but-curious servers who follow the assigned protocol, but might try to determine the index i of the file desired by the user.
Definition 2 (Privacy with t-Collusion). User privacy: Any set of at most t colluding nodes learns no information about the index i of the desired file, i.e., the mutual information
, |T | ≤ t . Server privacy: The user does not learn any information about the files other than the requested one, i.e.,
A scheme with both user and server privacy is called symmetric.
As customary, we assume that the size of the query vectors is negligible compared to the size of the files. Hence, we ignore the upload cost and define the PIR rate as follows: The PIR capacity is the supremum of PIR rates of all possible PIR schemes, for a fixed parameter setting.
Remark 1. As the user and the servers do not share any entanglement in this model, the number of bits obtained when receiving a qubit, i.e., the number of bits that can be communicated by transmitting a qubit from a server to the user without privacy considerations, is the dimension of the qubit.
C. Quantum Computation
In this section we introduce the notation to be used later on. For details we refer the reader to [14] .
A qubit is a 2-dimensional Hilbert space H along with a computational basis, that is, a prespecified orthonormal basis B = {|0 , |1 }. One typically takes H = C 2 . A state of H is a unit vector |ψ ∈ H, while ψ| denotes the adjoint of |ψ , that is, ψ| = |ψ † . Thus, φ|ψ and |φ ψ| define inner and outer products respectively.
We will work with 2-qubit systems H = H 1 ⊗ H 2 . In this case the computational basis is B ⊗2 = {|a | a ∈ F 2 2 }, where |a = |a 1 ⊗ |a 2 . We will also use the maximally entangled state
We denote by |Φ i the i-th qubit of |Φ . For a, b ∈ F 2 , the Weyl operator is defined as
We will write W i (a, b) when the Weyl operator acts on the i-th qubit. With this notation, the following properties of the Weyl operator are well-known and easy to verify:
Lemma 1. The set
is a Hermitian projector for any (a, b) ∈ F 2 2 and satisfies the completeness equation.
Proof. Straightforward.
Definition 4. The Bell measurement is the measurement defined by the PVM B F 2 2 described in Lemma 1. In the following we will require the two-sum transmission protocol [12] .
Two-sum transmission protocol: This protocol allows to send the sum of two pairs of classical bits by communicating two qubits. Suppose that Alice and Bob possess a qubit H A and H B , respectively, and share the maximally entangled state |Φ ∈ H A ⊗ H B . They would like to send the sum of Alice's information (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ F 2 2 and Bob's information
to Carol through two quantum channels. The protocol is given as follows: Let n be the number of servers, L = min l ∈ N : 4 l ≥ n and F 4 L be the finite field with 4 L elements. We present a protocol with user and server secrecy, in which the user retrieves a file x K from a DSS of n servers coded with an [n, k]-MDS storage code C. We denote the k × n generator matrix of the code by G C . In this setting, we can protect against (n − k)-collusion. Each file x i is split into k pieces and then divided into β stripes x i b = x i 1,b , . . . , x i k,b , i.e., the set of files is given by
with file size F = kβ log 2 4 L = 2kLβ. Server s ∈ [n]
stores the symbol y i s = y i s,1 , . . . , y i s,β , where y i s,b is the s-th column of x i b G C . Since the storage code is MDS, we need any k symbols of the codeword in order to retrieve the file [15] . Without loss of generality, we will retrieve the symbols stored in the first k servers, i.e., we will assume to retrieve the symbol y K s from server s ∈ [k] after β rounds. for any c ∈ n 2 − 1 . If n is odd, then an additional |Φ (l,b,p) is shared between H The protocol for querying the K-th file x K is depicted in Figure 1 and is described as follows:
A. A coded QPIR scheme
(1) Suppose the user wants to retrieve the symbol y K p stored in server p ∈ [k]. Then, he generates n − k independent and uniformly random vectors Z 
. First, he depacketizes y K p from the β elements of (F 4 L ) n for each p ∈ [k] and builds y K = y K 1 , . . . , y K k . Then, he computes the desired file x K from the equation 
B. Properties of the coded QPIR scheme
Lemma 2. The scheme of Section III-A is correct, i.e., fulfills Definition 1.
Proof. The final state before the measurement performed by the user is reached in the same way as the one of the QPIR protocol in [12] for each p ∈ [k]. Thus, during round b ∈ [β] and for packet l ∈ [L], that final state is
where φ n ∈ F 2 is determined upon H 1 , . . . , H n , G 1 , . . . , G n−1 and G.
We need to prove that the outcome of the measurement performed on the system H 
, where (a) holds because the dual of a code is its nullspace. If L > 1, we have that H The same argument applies to the packetization of the element G (b,p) = G (1,b,p) , . . . , G (L,b,p) . Thus, the correctness of the protocol is proved for every n ∈ N.
Remark 2. The presented scheme can be viewed as the "quantum version" of the scheme in [13] . In that scheme a vector holding the n replies of the servers (denoted H s in our work) can be viewed as a random codeword of a single parity check (SPC) code plus one symbol of the desired file added in one (known) position. As is the definition of SPCs, summing over all components of this received vector leaves only the symbol of the desired file. This sum is exactly the sum in (8) . In [7] the scheme of [13] was generalized to any t, k with t + k ≤ n, which allowed for recovering up to n − (k + t − 1) symbols in each round. Similarly, the received vector is a random codeword, but symbols of the desired file are added in multiple positions. To recover each of the desired symbols, the user performs multiple, distinct linear combinations of the remaining positions. The property that allows our quantum PIR protocol, as well as the protocols in [11] , [12] , to increase the rate compared to the classic setting is the fact that the user already receives a linear combination of these elements as an outcome of the quantum measurement, and therefore does not have to download all the symbols H s separately. However, this quantum measurement entails that only one single linear combination can be performed, and thereby only one symbol retrieved per round. This leads to the condition n − (k + t − 1) = 1 or equivalently n = k + t. Note that since the restriction of an MDS code to a subset of positions is again an MDS code, we can always apply the protocol to a subset of k + t servers if the actual number of servers in a storage system is n > k + t. n are independent of the index K and generated by encoding random vectors by the dual code C ⊥ . Since the dual code is MDS 1 , every set of n − k positions in these codewords is independent and hence at least n − k + 1 servers are needed in order to determine the file requested. Thus, user privacy is achieved. For each l ∈ [L], server secrecy is achieved because in every round b the received state of the user is independent of the fragments y i,(l) p,b with i = K and the measurement outcomes G (l,b,p) s are mutually independent and independent of any file for all s ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Theorem 1. The PIR rate of the scheme in Section III-A is
if n is even, 2 n+1 , if n is odd, where n = k + t.
Proof. The upload cost is U PIR = kn |Q| = kmn and lim F →∞ UPIR F = lim β→∞ kmn 2kLβ = 0. Hence, we consider the upload cost to be negligible compared to the download cost for a large file size F . As discussed in Remark 1, every qubit carries 1 bit of information. The download cost is Ln or L(n + 1) qubits per round and piece, i.e., D PIR = kLnβ or D PIR = kL(n + 1)β bits, if n is even or odd, respectively. The information retrieved is a symbol of F 4 L per round and piece, i.e., I PIR = kβ log 2 (4 L ) = 2kLβ bits. Thus, the rate is R PIR = 2kLβ kLnβ = 2 n if n is even and R PIR = 2kLβ kL(n+1)β = 2 n+1 if n is odd.
IV. [4,2]-CODED QPIR EXAMPLE
Let us consider n = 4 servers. Then L = 1, and the base field is F 4 = 0, 1, α, α 2 where α is a primitive element that satisfies α 2 + α + 1 = 0.
